What affects the discount to net asset value in the UK-listed property companies? by Ke, Q
 - 1 – 
02/03/2016 
What Affect the Discount to Net Asset Value in U. K. Listed Property Companies?  
Qiulin Ke 
The Bartlett School of Built Environment, University College London, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate empirically the factors that affect the discount to NAV in 
UK listed property companies from 2005 to 2013. In this paper, we extend the 
previous studies on the discount to NAV in UK property companies by relating the 
level of NAV discount to a broader set of variables such as size, liquidity, gearing, 
property portfolio diversification, company’s risk and return. Specially, we relate the 
discount to NAV to a set pf principal corporate governance mechanisms. The 
empirical test results report significantly positive relation between discount and 
gearing and risk, but negative relation with size, type of stock, level of focus on  
property type. Besides, a significantly negative relation can been seen between 
discount and corporate governance variables of board independence and institutional 
ownership, suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms do matter to the 
discounts to NAV in the UK listed property companies, especially in the up market.   
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Net Asset Value (NAV) is useful for the valuation of shares in sectors where the value 
of a company comes from the assets it holds (e.g. property companies) rather than the 
profit stream generated by the business. For these companies, there is normally a 
close correlation between the value of the property portfolio and the value of 
companies’ shares that are priced in relation to the net asset value (NAV) rather than 
on a price-to-earnings. The NAV in this context represents the underlying value of the 
property assets owned along with other assets, adjusted for liabilities and other claims 
on the company. The main argument is that at a fundamental level, property company 
share prices must reflect their underlying property investment value. However, there 
has been the existence and persistence of deviation of NAV of property companies 
from their market capitalization. Over the last three decades, it has generally been the 
case in the UK that the capital market has reflected a discount to NAV in the property 
companies, i.e. the stock market does not always value the property company 
according to its fundamental value. This discount / premium to NAV varies widely 
from one company to another and over time. NAV is an important performance metric 
and the managers of property companies aim to maximise the growth of their NAV, 
as investors generally regard the shares of a property company as essentially claims 
on assets. If the property company and the underlying net assets are priced efficiently, 
a discount to NAV implies that properties held indirectly through the property 
company are less valuable than if they were held directly.  
 
The primary activities of the UK property companies consist of the acquisition and 
subsequent holding of property assets, or/and purchase of property interests for resale 
in the short-term. Most of the UK listed property companies are non-REITs. UK 
REITs came into existence since 1st, January, 2007.  There are only 19 REITs and 
only one IPO so far. UK listed property companies adopt fair value accounting to 
report investment portfolio in the financial report. They have their property 
investment assets appraised annually and provide on an annual basis an accurate 
estimate of their total asset value and net asset value (NAV). Unlike US REITs, new 
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right shares issues are not frequently used by the UK property companies to raise 
capital since both directors and shareholders are reluctant to issue shares for a price 
below NAV and the market price of their shares frequently stands at a discount to the 
apparent net asset value per share. 
 
UK listed property companies have long been recognized that the market 
capitalization of property companies is less than their stated net asset value (NAV). 
The received wisdom has been that this discount was primarily a function of the 
market penalising property companies for the tax leakage they suffered. Property 
companies pay corporation tax on realized capital gains arising. Thus, the NAV is not 
necessarily what shareholders would realize in the event of a property being sold. The 
REIT regime has repaired the tax leak for 19 UK listed property companies; but they 
still suffer a NAV discount so far. The phenomenon of discount to NAV in the UK 
listed property companies has only   been examined in a few occasions. These studies 
employed the “rational” approach and “noise trader” approach to examine the 
discount to NAV phenomenon.  The “rational” approach hypothesizes that the 
discount to NAV as being the result of company specific factors relating to such 
factors as management quality, tax liability and the type of stocks held by the funds. 
The “noise trader” approach was associated with the work of Shiller (1989), Schleifer 
and Vishny (1990), and Lee, et. al. (1991). According to noise trader theory, 
fluctuations in departures from NAV are caused by changes in investor sentiment. 
That is when investors become pessimistic about future returns, the discounts are high; 
when investors are optimistic, the discounts are low. Average discounts exist because 
the unpredictability of investor sentiment impounds a risk of holding a share in 
addition to the risk inherent in the company’s portfolio.  
 
Adams and Venmore-Rowland (1989) are the first to address the issue of discounts 
for UK listed property companies, followed by Barkham and Ward (1999) who 
expanded the research by testing a full range of available hypotheses on a set of thirty 
UK listed property companies for the years of 1993 through 1995. These studies 
document that discounts are the result of agency costs, contingent capital gains tax 
and a number of other firm’s specific factors. They also find the discounts result from 
the interaction of noise traders and rational investors.  
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This research differs from these prior studies by incorporating the corporate 
governance mechanisms into the analysis of the discounts to NAV in the UK listed 
property companies. We employ a more elaborate sample consisting of 41 UK listed 
property companies for the years from 2005 through 2013. This sample period is 
particularly advantageous for two reasons. First of all, the sample period witnessed 
the market moving from bull to bear, the global financial crisis with the significant 
fall of property value; many of the property companies trade at from premium to 
discount, offering a widest range of divergence within a firm and across time series. 
Secondly, UK REIT scheme was launched since 1st  January, 2007, which was widely 
believed to improve the tax efficiency, therefore, the discount to NAV in the property 
companies should be diminishing. However,  most of the REITs trade at discount. The 
premium/discount to NAV indicates that the stock prices of property companies 
reflect many factors other than the fair value and the net asset value of property 
companies. Listed real estate is often seen as equities rather than real estate. The listed 
real estate returns do not reflect direct real estate returns in the short run (one to two 
years), whilst listed real estate and direct real estate are more correlated or co-
integrated over the medium to longer term (three and more  years) (e.g.  Hoesli and 
Oikarinen, 2012). 
 
In this study, patterned after the prior studies, we examine a set of traditional variables 
of firm-specific characteristics, firm risk and the portfolio dispersion. We also control 
market liquidity, the more liquid the market is, the narrower the difference between 
share price and the underlying net asset value of a listed property company will be 
The primary focus is on the relationship of corporate governance practice and the 
level of premium/discount. We argue that good corporate governance would enhance 
the firm value; therefore, should reduce the discount.. To test the hypothesis, a set of 
principal corporate governance factors such as board structure, insider ownership and 
ownership concentration are employed into the tests. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that relates the discount to NAV in the UK. listed property 
companies to the corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
The empirical analysis consists of two parts that explore the determinants of the level 
of and changes in premium/discount to NAV over the 2005-2013 period. First, we 
specify and estimate a model of cross-sectional variation in premium/discount using a 
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sample of individual companies over the period of 2005-2013. We find that the level 
of premium/discount is negatively related to a firm’s size, trading stock held for sales 
and focused property portfolio, but positively related to gearing,  risk and sector 
average discount. The corporate governance factors such as board independence and 
institutional ownership have strong influence on premium/discount to NAV. Secondly 
we test the time variations in premium/discount to NAV by splitting the study period 
into two subperiods: up market (2005-2006) and down market (2007-2009). Changes 
in premium/discount over time have two common elements which are related to but 
not entirely explained by the risk and the independence of board of directors. The 
effect of corporate governance factors are more pronounced in the up market period. 
 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Data selection 
procedure is discussed along with description of research methodology in section 3. 
The statistics test results are discussed in section 4, followed by concluding remarks 
in section 5.  
 
2. Literature review  
 
The UK listed property companies have long been recognized to trade at discount to 
NAV. However, so far there are only a couple of studies examining this puzzle over 
the last two decades. These studies have applied the “readily available” theories about 
the discount to NAV in closed-end funds to the analysis of  UK. listed property 
companies, arguing  that U. K. listed property companies have the characteristics of 
closed-end fund. The market value of the property portfolio the property companies 
hold are appraised annually and reported in the financial report. If the properties that 
the company holds are appreciated, the revenue of the sale of these properties is 
subject to capital gains tax. This capital gains tax is believed to be one of the factors 
that cause the discount to NAV in closed-end U.K. listed property companies. Adams 
and Venmore-Rowland (1989) are the first to address the issue of discount to NAV in 
the U. K. listed property companies. Their study finds that a reduction in contingent 
tax liability in the 1980s led to a reduction in average discounts. Besides the tax, they 
also discuss the other factors such as the added value of managers’ entrepreneur skill, 
liquidity, capital structure risk and insider ownership as potential explanations for the 
property company discount, but they did not test them empirically.  
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Barkham and Ward (1999) systematically examine the discount issue of thirty-nine U. 
K. listed property companies from 1993 through to 1995. They extend the previous 
study by not only empirical testing the potential factors proposed by Adams and 
Venmore-Rowland, they also take the market sentiment and noise-trader hypothesis 
into account. Their study documents that tax, firm size, holding of trading stock and 
historical return succeed in explaining about 15% of the cross-sectional variation. 
When the noise-trader hypothesis is included in the test, this factor succeeds in 
improving the explanatory power of their model towards 33%.   
 
Bond and Shilling (2003) and Brounen and Laak (2005) perform similar analysis in 
pan-European property companies’ samples. These studies extend the previous 
research by considering the impact of company risk, value-based portfolio 
characteristics and index membership of a firm and help improve the understanding 
why some companies are undervalued by investors. For instance, Bond and Shilling 
(2003) analyze the discount to NAV in fifty property companies originating from 
eight European countries. They extend the work of Barkham and Ward (1999) by the 
inclusion of total risk and systematic risk and succeed in explaining around 50% of 
the cross-sectional variation in discounts. Their report documents positive and 
significant relations between discount and both types of risk. Later, Brounen and Laak 
(2005) examine across-section variation in NAV in seventy-two European property 
companies at 2002. Their study extends these prior studies by considering portfolio 
focus and European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) index membership in the 
model specification.   They report that there is significant relationship between 
discounts and firm’s risk, size, leverage and trading liquidity.  They also find that the 
spread of portfolio across property type increases the level of discount and the index 
membership matters when it comes to discount.  
 
NAV is one of the key performance indicators used by company managers and 
investors to evaluate the performance of a property company. The property shares are 
priced in the financial market. When looking at property companies, investors in 
financial market are not looking at real estate. They are considering shares; the 
business of the company just happens to be real estate related, therefore, in the short 
run, the property shares are just equity, influenced by equity market and by investor 
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sentiment. Investor sentiment is explained as expectations or judgements that are not 
fully justified by available information on market fundamentals. Investors who rely to 
some degree on sentiment are termed ‘noise traders’, who by definition misprice 
investments in relation to rational expectations (Shiller, 1989; De Long et al., 1990; 
Shleifer and Summers, 1990), so property shares may not fully reflect the underlying 
fundamentals of property companies.  
 
The value of property portfolio held by the company is appraised in the property 
market. (more?)  
Apart from the underpinning NAV of a property company, there are some other 
factors that could influence the market value of the company. One strand of theory 
that is often used to evaluate the value of a company is corporate governance practice. 
General finance theory is replete with empirical studies on the impact of corporate 
governance on firm value. There are numerous studies on the issue in real estate 
finance literature.  Most of these studies are concerned about the US REITs. For 
instance, Capozza and Seguin (2003) study the impact of insider ownership on the 
discount to NAV in US REITs and  find that higher levels of inside ownership convey 
a signal of higher quality management and   higher REITs valuation, but lower 
managerial expenses, systematic risk and debt since  managers have incentives to 
make decisions that are in their best interests if the managers retain the entire equity 
stake in the assets they manage; thus, the  agency conflicts can be eliminated (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Wang, et al. (1995) finds that REITs with greater institutional 
ownership exhibit significantly higher risk-adjusted performance. Ghosh and Sirmans 
(2003) examine the impact of board independence and ownership structure on the 
performance of US REITs.  They find outside directors weakly enhance performance 
and the institution ownership or block ownership enhances performance. Recently, 
Kohl and Schaefers (2010) study the impact of corporate governance on market value 
of the property companies in four European countries. The market value is proxied by 
Tobin Q. They report that smaller board of directors, higher insider ownership and 
greater transparency of real estate specific disclosure would enhance a firm’s value. 
These studies suggest that the corporate governance is rewarded by the capital market 
participants in terms of higher market valuations. The research of relationship of the 
corporate governance of UK listed property companies and corporate value is 
relatively scant, however there is plenty of studies of the corporate governance of UK 
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listed companies. For instance  Crossan (2011) studies the effect of a separation of 
ownership from control on 406 UK listed firms with simultaneous equations and find 
there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Weir and 
Laing (2003) analyse the board composition and ownership structures of a sample 
of companies that have been acquired and find the firms with the same person acting 
as CEO and chair, a higher proportion of non-executive directors, larger institutional 
shareholdings and higher director shareholdings were more likely to be acquired. 
They also find that small firms have higher CEO shareholdings.  
Corporate governance and the role of non‐ executive directors in large UK 
companies: an empirical study, Corporate Governance: The international journal of 
business in society, 2004, 4(2) 
 
This study will further extend the real estate literature by incorporating corporate 
governance factors to bear on the explanations of property company’s 
premium/discount.   The focus of the study  is not only on explaining the 
premium/discount to NAV, but also the changing dynamics of U. K. property 
companies value as the market transitions from up to down. This view complements 
the traditional set of rational explanations.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
The data are collected from SNL, Datastream and financial reports of the property 
companies. The data selection criterion requires a company to have more than five 
years of data available.  This strict criterion maximizes the consistency over the study 
period, but reduces the number of companies that could be included in the final 
sample to 41 property companies and 335 observations.  The definition of research 
variables are reported in Table 1. 
Insert table 1. 
 
The aim is to examine the factors that explain the divergence of property share price 
from NAV, with particular emphasis on corporate governance factors. The previous 
studies document that at the macro (or market) level the value of property share is 
strongly related to the value of unsecuritized property over the long-term, but not over 
 - 9 – 
02/03/2016 
the short-term (Barkham and Geltner, 1996; Wang, et al. 1997).  Based on this 
assumption, annual discounts for each year end is computed as  
 
 %100/) xNAVNAVPDIS itititit    (1) 
 
Where DISit  is the discount of the property company i at time t;  NAVit  is the net 
asset value per share of the company1;  Pit is the price of the property company’s share 
at the yearend day. If the share price of the underlying property company exceeds the 
NAV of the property company DIS >0 in equation 1. The company trades at premium; 
otherwise, if DIS< 0, the company trades at discount. It is possible that DIS can vary 
over time with changes in property market condition. For instance, if investors are 
opportunistic about the market, they are willing to pay a premium.  The data are 
winsorized at 5% and 95% levels to remove the outliers.  
 
In order to explore the factors that might explain the cross-sectional variation in the 
discount to NAV, we express the discount as a function of the hypothesized variables 
and use ordinary least squares regression in the following model. 
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          (2) 
Principal corporate governance variables are denoted as CGMm (with m ranging from 
one to four). i denotes the individual company i; t denotes the period t for company i.  
  
The tests are equipped with four model specifications. In order to understand why the 
vast variations exist, we start with firm specific characteristics variables in parallel 
with the ones used in the study of Barkham and Ward (1999).  The six independent 
variables in the first model are defined for inclusion in the analysis. SIZE is the 
natural log of total assets value. Barkham and Ward argue that large companies might 
exhibit larger discount due to the discrete nature of asset valuation in the U. K. and be 
more difficult to liquidate in the market. They find larger firms have higher discount.  
However, the large firms may be more popular among investors and therefore allow 
                                                 
1 NAV per share is EPRA NAV taken from company reports. No adjustments have been made. When 
not available, the NAV per share has been calculated as : total assets – total liabilities / number of 
shares outstanding. 
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less space for price dispersions and smaller discount (Capozza and Lee, 1996; 
Brounen and Laak, 2005). On balance, therefore, there is no ex-ant expectation for the 
size.  GEAR is measured to be total debt as a percentage of total assets and is expected 
to have a positive coefficient by virtue of the way in which the discount is calculated.  
There is a potential source of error arising from the treatment of property held for 
trading. Trading property is usually shown in the financial report as the lower of cost 
or net realizable value which may affect the NAV. Following Barkham and Ward, we 
define a variable, the trading stock held (TRADING) as a proportion of total assets and 
expect it to have a negative coefficient.  The inherent capital gains tax liability of the 
property portfolio is always regarded as one of the major reasons to explain the 
discount to NAV in the U. K. listed property companies (Millman, 1988; Adams and 
Venmore-Rowland, 1989). Many property investment companies have substantial 
unrealized reserves as part of their capital due to the upward movement in the value of 
their assets. Revenue from the sale of this property is subject to taxation2. To account 
for this issue, we include an explanatory variable (TAX), which is defined as reported 
contingent liability to pay tax on capital gains as a percentage of total assets and 
expect it to be positively related to the discount. Besides, included are market 
performance indicators represented by stock return of the proceeding years (RETURN) 
and a company’s total risk (RISK). In line with Malkiel (1995) and other prior 
research, the monthly mean stock return over the proceeding two years is used as a 
proxy for a firm reputation among investors. This variable is expected to have a 
negative relation with discount, as investors tend to overprice strong-performing fund. 
Risk is measured as the standard deviation of stocks prices in the preceding year and 
is expected to have a positive coefficient. In model 2, property sector average 
discount (SECDIS) is included. SECDIS measures real estate sector average discount 
at the balance sheet date. Sector-wide positive or negative sentiment is an important 
influence on individual company’s discount. This variable is expected to have positive 
coefficient.  
 
We extend the study of Barkham and Ward (1999) in two ways. First, we examine the 
effect of property portfolio diversification on the discounts.  Secondly, we employ a 
                                                 
2 Capital gains tax is not applicable to the companies that were converted into REIT status since 
January, 2007. for the property companies with REIT status, the gains from selling U.K properties are 
exempt from tax, provided they are not held for trading or sold in the three years after completion of 
development. 
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novel approach by incorporating corporate governance mechanisms into the model. 
The portfolio of a property company’s assets can be spread across property types 
(offices, retail, industrial, residential and other others) and/or across border. Following 
(Boer, et al., 2005), we measure the portfolio spread of company i to be quantified 
using the asset-based Herfindahl index (HTYPE). Herfindahl index adds the sum of 
squares of proportions in property types based on the information disclosed on annual 
reports.  
 



Rr
tirtitype
SH
2
,,,,    (3) 
Where, Htype,i,t  is Herfindahl index based on the value of property type for  company i 
at time t. r represents the set of property types, Sr,i,t is the proportion of firm i’s assets 
invested in property sector r at time t. A Herfindahl Index can vary between almost 
zero, indicating a wide spread diversification over property types and one, which 
indicates a complete focus of all assets in only one property type. We also construct a 
dummy variable for geographic diversification, that is, if a company invests across 
border, it equals one; otherwise, zero. Corporate diversification along the two 
dimensions for real estate companies is important. For instance, Ro and Ziobrowski 
(2011) investigate whether property type specialized U. S. REITs outperform 
diversified REITs by examining abnormal returns and find no evidence of superior 
performance associated with REITs specializing in a single property type. Brounen 
and Laak (2005) find that the company holding highly focused property type has low 
discount. It could be argued that there is no need for publicly traded property 
companies to hold a diversified portfolio since investors can diversify their portfolios 
on their own (Cronqvist, et al. 2001; Chan et al. 2003). Boer, et al. (2005) argues that 
within real estate sector a focused strategy increases both a firm’s return and risk. 
Thus, on balance, no ex-ant signs are anticipated for the two diversification variables. 
 
 Empirical studies suggest that good corporate practice improves the firm value. A set 
of widely-accepted corporate governance mechanisms is applied. In this context, the 
variables to measure a company’s governance strength include board size and board 
independence as proxies for board structure, insider ownership as proxy for incentive 
structure, institutional ownership as proxy for concentrated ownership. Board size 
(BSIZE) is measured as the number of directors on board. The board independence is 
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proxied by outside directors on board. Outside directors are defined as the percentage 
of non-executive directors (NONEXEDIR) without family relationships to the 
managing board as well as representatives of companies that are not involved in 
related part transaction. Insider ownership (INSIDERS) is calculated as percentage of 
equity held by the executive management of the company. Institutional ownership 
(INST), the proxy for ownership concentration, is measured as the percentage of 
equity held by top three substantial institutions, such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, private equity funds or other firms that are not predominantly owned by 
managers or directors. These governance variables are   expected to have negative 
coefficients.   
 
Figure 1 displays the discounts to NAV in the property companies and the sector 
average discount. In 2005 and 2006, the firms included in the sample trade at 
premium averagely; subsequently, they trade at discount. The discount reaches 48per 
cent in 2008 and fall to 22% in 2009. Compared with the property sector average 
discount, the companies in the sample have a much wider range of divergence of 
share price from NAV per share. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of research variables. The average discount 
over 2005-2009 is 2.62 per cent with a considerable across sectional variation, namely 
from 628.57 per cent discount to 433.33 per cent premium. The book value of total 
assets is £179.26 billion on average; the sample is highly skewed as evidenced by the 
much lower median value. The importance of insider ownership and institutional 
ownership is evident as they own 17.15 per cent and 24 per cent of outstanding 
property shares respectively. The average size of board is 8 directors, 53 per cent of 
whom are independent directors.  
 
Insert table 2 
 
4. Results 
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Before running regression tests, the explanatory data are examined using a Pearson 
correlations test. The results are reported in table 3. There are some noteworthy cross-
relations. For example, there are strong negative relations between discount (DIS) and 
trading stock (TRADING), Herfindahl index (HTYPE), board independence 
(NONEXEDIR) and institutional ownership (INST), but strong positive relation with 
risk (RISK) and sector average discount (SECDIS). Apparently, firm size (SIZE) is 
positively related with gearing (GEAR), return (RETURN) and risk (RISK); the large 
firms invest across boarder and have highly specialized property type. Large firms 
also have larger board size, more non-executive directors, but they have less insider 
equity and fewer trading stock held.  
 
Insert table 3 
 
 
Table 4 reports the OLS regression test results. In model 1, discounts are first 
regressed on the firm specific characteristics variables. The outputs as reported in 
table 4 exhibit significant relations between discounts and firm size, gearing, trading 
stock and risk. All signs corroborate with previous results, except for firm size, which 
has a negative coefficient.   Consistent with Bond and Shilling (2003) and Brounen 
and Laak (2005), the test results document positive coefficient for the risk, indicating 
risk increases the discount.  Contrary to Barkhan and Ward (1999), but consistent 
with Brounen and Laak (2005), SIZE is negatively related with the discounts, 
implying the largest firms have lowest discount. Larger firms are generally believed 
to have a more transparent disclosure, since total cost of disclosure is decreasing with 
firm size (Bushman, et al. 2004; Khanna, et al. 2004; Hossain, et al. 2005; Kohl and 
Schaefer, 2010), they are more popular among investors and therefore allow less 
space for price dispersions (Brounen and Laak, 2005). The tax has expected sign, but 
is insignificant, inconsistent with the findings by Barkham and Ward (1999) who find 
that contingent capital gains tax is one of the important influential factors in discounts. 
U. K. REIT is significantly and positively associated with discount. The objective of 
the REIT’s regime launched in January, 2007 is to remove tax inefficiency. The 
benefits of REITs are that the company will not pay any corporation tax on UK 
investments.  But U. K REITs trade at discount. However, this should be explained 
with caution, since the property companies started to be converted into REIT status at 
the time when the market turned downsize.  
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Model 2 with portfolio variables included has more or less the same pattern of 
direction and significance amongst individual variables. R2 increases by 3%. Whilst 
across-boarder spread of property portfolio denoted as INTER appears to be 
insignificant; there is a negative and significant relation between HTYPE and its 
discount to NAV, in line with the findings of Brounen and Laak (2005). The sample 
contains a wide variation from focusing in one single property type to wide dispersion. 
The large U. K. listed property companies tend to have a high level of property type 
focus as reported in table 3. Prior research by Capozza and Seguin (1999), Cronqvist, 
et al. (2001) and Boer, et al. (2005) has shown that unfocused publicly traded real 
estate companies, particularly those diversified by property type are intransparent, 
very expensive to manage and ultimately less successful and a focus strategy could 
increase both a firm’s return and risk. In Model 3, SECDIS is included. As expected, 
this variable has significant and positive impact on the discount, suggesting that 
individual property company’s discount is influenced by sector-wide sentiment. 
Inclusion of SECDIS increases R2 by 3 per cent to 20 per cent from 17 per cent,  
much lower than the result from Barkham and Ward’s model in which the sector 
sentimental boosted 50 per cent of explanatory power.   
 
The final step in the analysis involves the corporate governance variables of  BSIZE, 
NONEXEDIR, INSIDERS and INST in the sample as presented on Model 4.  The 
negative and significant relationships between discount and NONEXEDIR and INST  
are found. The companies with more independent directors and higher institutional 
ownership have lower discount to NAV. The insider ownership is negatively 
associated with discount, but insignificant. Inclusion of corporate governance 
variables in the test yields the same pattern of direction and significance among the 
individual variables, but R2 increases toward to 24 per cent from 20 per cent. In other 
words, good corporate governance practice, that is, more independent board and 
higher institutional ownership, can be an important influence on a company’s discount. 
This result is fully in line with the general finance theory, that is the good corporate 
governance practice can improve the value of the company and investors are willing 
to pay a premium to a company that have more independent board and high 
ownership concentration. 
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Insert table 5 
 
The study period encompasses both the run up in property prices and the subsequent 
down turn. To investigate the possibility that the results differ systematically in up 
and down market years, we re-estimate variants of the basic models separately over 
2005-2006, a time of rising and /or premium to NAV and 2007-2009, a time of falling 
and /or discount. The results shown in table 5 and 6 are interesting in that the signs, 
magnitudes and statistical significance differ over the two periods for a number of the 
coefficients. In the up market, firm size, gearing and tax  are statistically insignificant. 
Gearing has “wrong” sign and becomes significant in Model 4. Model 1 in table 5 
reports that only three coefficients are statistically significant, those on TRADING, 
RETURN and RISK. The estimation of trading stock held could cause accounting 
issue; thus have impact on the calculation of NAV. The properties designated for 
trading are held in the balance sheet at the lower of cost or market value. This implies 
that trading stock will never be shown in the accounts above their market value but it 
might sometimes be below it. If assets are recorded below their market value, the 
calculated NAV and therefore the discount will be reduced. This effect is particularly 
pronounced in the up market when there are more property trading transactions. In the 
up market, investors are willing to pay premium for a company with good 
performance record proxied by proceeding three years’ return. When SECDIS is 
included in Model 2, surprisingly, this variable is marginally insignificant. Both 
portfolio diversification variables are also not significantly related to discount as 
presented in Model 3. Inclusion of corporate governance variables increase the 
explanatory power of the model by 61 per cent and  R2 is boosted to 46 per cent from 
18 per cent. This time, INSIDER becomes significant and negatively related to 
discount along with NONEXEDIR and INST.  The test results show that investors are 
more willing to pay a premium for the company with strong corporate governance 
practice in the up market. 
 
Insert table 6 
  
Table 6 reports the test results in the down market. Unlike in the up market, SIZE and 
GEAR become significant and have “correct” signs. But TRADING becomes 
insignificant due to the thin market and less transactions. TAX becomes significant as 
reported in Model 1. RISK remains significant, but not RETURN. HTYPE and 
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SECDIS are statistically significant as presented in Model 2 and 3. When the 
corporate governance variables are included in Model 4, only NONEXEDIR remains 
statistically significantly; all others become insignificant. Compared with the results 
in the up market, the explanatory power of corporate governance mechanisms 
becomes less dominant in the down market. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The property company discounts have been exhibited substantial variability over time. 
Through 2005-2006 the U. K. listed property companies in the sample trade at 
premium to NAV averagely, but since 2007 they trade at discount to NAV. This paper 
aims to provide new insights in the further understanding of the divergence of 
property share from its NAV per share cross section and over time; especially it 
examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on discounts.  
 
We find that the level of discount to NAV is negatively related to size, trading stock, 
specialized property portfolio, but positively associated to gearing, risk and sector 
sentimental.  The empirical results of the paper also find that the corporate 
governance practice does matter to the performance of U. K property companies. 
Capital participants investing in listed property companies seem to appreciate board 
independence and higher levels of institutional ownership. The changes in 
premium/discount over time have two strong common elements across property 
companies, which are related to but not entirely explained by the common element in 
risk and board independence. These common effects are more pronounced in the up 
market period of 2005-2006.  Overall, the results are consistent with corporate 
governance theory and further provide evidence that good corporate governance 
practices can enhance firm’s value and reduce the discounts to NAV in the property 
companies.  
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Table 1. The definition of study variables and their expected sign 
Variables Definition 
Expected 
Sign 
SIZE  Natural log of total assets value  ± 
Trading asset 
Properties held for sale as a percentage of total 
assets 
 + 
Tax 
Contingent liability to pay tax on capital gains as a 
percentage of total assets  
 - 
Return Daily mean stock return over the preceding two years  + 
Risk 
Measured as the standard deviation of stocks 
prices in the preceding year. It is winsorized at 
5% and 95% levels. 
 - 
Market DIS 
Property sector discount. The data are collected from  
EPRA. 
 + 
Hindex 
Herfindahl index based on value of real estate 
type for  company i at time t 
 ± 
INTER 
Dummy variable: it equals1 If the company invests 
across boarder, otherwise 0. 
 + 
A-B spread 
Calculated as( Ask-Bid)/ ((Ask + Bid)/2), They are the 
last three months ask and bid before the year end 
 
BSIZE The number of directors on board        + 
NON-exedir Percentage  of non-executive directors on board  + 
Insider ownership Natural log of percentage of shares held by the 
executive management.  
 ± 
Top three Natural log of percentage of equity held by top 
three substantial shareholders 
 + 
REIT 
Dummy variable. If the company is REIT, it 
equals 1; otherwise, 0. 
+ 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
 - 20 – 
02/03/2016 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of research variables 
 
  DISNAV 
Debt/ 
Assets 
Trading 
assets tax 
Market 
DIS Risk Return INTER 
Mean -11.90  39.03  3.42  2.49  -11.48  58.07  2.61  0.23  
Median -11.43  38.68  0.00  0.17  -11.19  25.30  5.27  0.00  
Std. Dev 21.68  17.98  7.92  4.42  12.81  103.32  21.80  0.42  
Min -42.27  0.00  0.00  0.00  -35.63  0.24  -29.00  0.00  
Max 19.00  98.59  51.32  20.32  10.13  691.03  33.00  1.00  
   BSIZE  
 Non-
exedir  
 INSIDERS  
ownership 
 Top 
three  Hindex 
 A-B 
Spread  
 Total 
asset 
(billion)   REIT  
Mean 
           
7.84  
                                          
60.92  14.63  
         
25.85  
                    
6,032.10  
                  
0.03  
                             
187.46  
    
0.34  
Median 
           
8.00  
                                          
55.56  
  
3.57  
         
22.92  
                    
5,046.00  
                  
0.01  
                               
65.36  
      
-    
Std. Dev 
           
2.72  
                                          
19.60  18.95  
         
13.12  
                    
2,747.19  
                  
0.09  
                             
310.71  
    
0.47  
Min. 
           
3.00  
                                          
30.77  
       
-    
       
3.50  
                    
1,000.00  
                  
0.00  
                                  
1.07  
   
-    
Max. 
         
15.00  
                                       
100.00  
   
67.11  
         
70.33  
                  
10,000.00  
                  
1.34  
                         
1,895.75  
        
1.00  
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation test of study variables 
 
  
DIS 
NAV LogTA 
Debt/ 
Assets 
Trading 
assets Tax 
Market 
DIS Risk Return INTER REIT BSIZE 
Non-
exedir 
INSIDER 
ownership 
Top 
three Hindex 
DIS NAV 1 
              LogTA 0.21  1.00  
             Debt/ 
Assets -0.12  0.19  1.00  
            Trading 
assets 0.07  -0.12  0.04  1.00  
           Tax -0.03  -0.00  -0.16  -0.14  1.00  
          Market DIS 0.45  0.03  -0.15  -0.02  0.08  1.00  
         Risk -0.05  0.25  -0.15  -0.06  0.25  -0.10  1.00  
        Return 0.46  0.06  -0.32  -0.01  0.25  0.43  -0.00  1.00  
       INTER -0.11  0.26  0.10  -0.14  0.28  -0.00  0.17  -0.08  1.00  
      REIT 0.02  0.31  -0.02  -0.20  -0.32  -0.13  0.10  -0.13  0.01  1.00  
     BSIZE 0.19  0.66  0.07  0.03  -0.07  0.02  0.12  0.14  0.12  0.31  1.00  
    Non -exedir 0.05  0.10  0.35  -0.19  -0.24  -0.00  -0.21  -0.13  -0.00  -0.24  -0.17  1.00  
   INSIDER 
ownership -0.24  -0.34  -0.05  0.01  0.41  -0.05  0.13  0.04  0.03  -0.18  -0.21  -0.33  1.00  
  Top three -0.02  0.06  0.10  -0.12  -0.12  -0.02  -0.06  -0.14  -0.00  -0.19  -0.16  0.47  -0.22  1.00  
 Hindex 0.13  0.10  0.31  -0.05  -0.05  0.00  0.02  -0.00  0.07  0.11  0.19  -0.04  0.02  0.02  1.00  
A-B Spread -0.24  -0.34  0.21  0.03  0.01  -0.02  -0.10  -0.20  0.06  -0.11  -0.28  0.10  0.13  0.05  -0.09  
Note: Bold represents significance at 1% and 5% levels. 
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Table x. Regression  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -51.384 -65.821 -45.008 -39.772 
 
(-5.276)*** (-5.637)*** (-4.638)*** (-3.173)*** 
Size 8.011 9.871 6.200 2.222 
 
(4.772)*** (6.248)*** (3.544)*** (0.89) 
Debt/ Assets -0.208 -0.267 -0.115 -0.132 
 
(-3.164)*** (-6.501)*** (-1.766)* (-1.895)* 
Trading assets 0.297 0.229 0.278 0.459 
 
(2.022)** (1.583) (2.206)** (3.187)*** 
Tax -0.291 0.777 0.796 2.120 
 
(-0.286) (0.734) (0.861) (2.290)*** 
REIT 
 
-3.469 2.311 6.084 
  
(-1.26) (0.968) (2.535)** 
HType 
 
0.002 0.001 0.001 
  
(4.309)*** (2.566)*** (3.132)*** 
INTER 
 
-0.235 -6.153 -6.228 
  
(-3.053)*** (-2.426)** (-2.536)*** 
Market DIS 
  
0.535 0.526 
   
(6.397)*** (6.473)*** 
Risk 
  
-0.013 -0.007 
   
(-1.306) (-0.468) 
Return 
  
0.277 0.278 
   
(5.186)*** (5.295)*** 
A-B Spread 
  
-21.956 -24.487 
   
(-1.754)* (-2.013)** 
BSIZE 
   
0.397 
    
(0.764) 
Non-executive 
directors 
   
0.174 
    
(2.551)*** 
Log Insider 
ownership 
   
-2.819 
    
(-2.01)** 
Log Top three 
   
2.747 
    
(0.629) 
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.211 0.359 0.383 
F-test 7.545 12.508 17.98 14.8 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
Note: ***, ** and * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -43.384 -53.483 -37.286 -35.724 
 
(-4.630)*** (-5.413)*** (-3.914)*** (-2.913)** 
Size 7.894 8.88 6.082 2.746 
 
(4.919)*** (5.157)*** (3.578)*** (1.151) 
Debt/ Assets -0.159 -0.21 -0.033 -0.052 
 
(-2.514)*** (-3.098)*** (-0.507) (-0.758) 
Trading assets .262 0.24 0.281 0.416 
 
(1.887)* (1.716)* (2.337)** (3.318)*** 
Tax -1.992 -0.93 -0.388 1.166 
 
(-2.044)** (-0.864) (-0.415) (1.156) 
REIT  0.65 4.244 8.018 
 
 (0.241) (1.799)* (3.142)*** 
HType  0.00 0.001 0.001 
 
 (3.177)*** (2.397)** (2.873)** 
INTER  -7.71 -5.508 -5.818 
 
 (-2.659)*** (-2.165)** (-2.322)** 
Market DIS   0.559 0.555 
 
  (6.871)*** (6.920)*** 
Risk   -0.021 -0.013 
 
  (-2.160)** (-1.351) 
Return   0.210 0.235 
 
  (3.956)*** (4.462)*** 
A-B Spread   -20.550 -23.570 
 
  (-1.689)* (-1.970)** 
BSIZE    0.183 
 
   (0.370) 
Non-executive 
directors    0.143 
 
   (2.108)** 
Log Insider 
ownership    -2.204 
 
   (-1.612) 
Log Top three    5.330 
 
   (1.246) 
Year dummy -14.913 -13.30 -10.758 -10.474 
 (-5.746)*** (-5.048)*** (-4.498)*** (-4.389)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.188 0.396 0.419 
F-test 13.203 10.670 19.248 16.077 
P-value 0 0 0 0 
 
